Against Game Theory

People make choices. Often, the outcome depends on choices other people make. What mental steps do people go through when making such choices? Game theory, the most influential model of choice in economics and the social sciences, offers an answer, one based on games of strategy such as chess and checkers: the chooser considers the choices that others will make and makes a choice that will lead to a better outcome for the chooser, given all those choices by other people. It is universally established in the social sciences that classical game theory (even when heavily modified) is bad at predicting behavior. But instead of abandoning classical game theory, those in the social sciences have mounted a rescue operation under the name of “behavioral game theory.” Its main tool is to propose systematic deviations from the predictions of game theory, deviations that arise from character type, for example. Other deviations purportedly come from cognitive overload or limitations. The fundamental idea of behavioral game theory is that, if we know the deviations, then we can correct our predictions accordingly, and so get it right. There are two problems with this rescue operation, each of them is fatal. (1) For a chooser, contemplating the range of possible deviations, as there are many dozens, actually makes it exponentially harder to figure out a path to an outcome. This makes the theoretical models useless for modeling human thought or human behavior in general. (2) Modeling deviations are helpful only if the deviations are consistent, so that scientists (and indeed decision makers) can make predictions about future choices on the basis of past choices. But the deviations are not consistent. In general, deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In addition, people’s beliefs are in general not consistent with their choices. Accordingly, all hope is hollow that we can construct a general behavioral game theory. What can replace it? We survey some of the emerging candidates

The Dilemma of Direct Democracy

The dilemma of direct democracy is that voters may not always be able to make welfare- improving decisions. Lupia’s seminal work has led us to believe that voters can substitute voting cues for substantive policy knowledge. Lupia, however, emphasized that cues were valuable under certain conditions and not others. In what follows, we present three main findings regarding voters and what they know about California’s Proposition 7. First, much like Lupia reported, we show voters who are able to recall endorsements for or against a ballot measure vote similarly to people who recall certain basic facts about the initiative. We show, second, that voters whose stated policy preferences would otherwise suggest they would favor the “no” position cast their ballots with far less error than do people who favor the “yes” position. One thing this suggests is that many voters may employ a “defensive no” strategy when faced with complex policy choices on the ballot. Our third result is a bit surprising: we find that better- informed voters, whether this information is derived from factual knowledge of the initiative or from knowledge of well-publicized voting cues, are no more likely to make reasoned decisions than those who are, by our measure, uninformed. This suggests that existing theories of voter choice, especially in direct democracy, may be inadequate. We conclude with some preliminary policy recommendations that could help improve the information environment for initiatives and referenda by providing key information on the ballot

Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?

The way economists and other social scientists model how people make interdependent decisions is through the theory of games. Psychologists and behavioral economists, however, have established many deviations from the predictions of game theory. In response to these findings, a broad movement has arisen to salvage the core of game theory. Extant models of interdependent decision-making try to improve their explanatory domain by adding some corrective terms or limits. We will make the argument that this approach is misguided. For this approach to work, the deviations would have to be consistent. Drawing in part on our experimental results, we will argue that deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In turn, the problem of finding an equilibrium strategy is not easier but rather is exponentially more difficult. It does not seem that game theory can be repaired by adding corrective terms (such as consideration of personal characteristics, social norms, heuristic or bias terms, or cognitive limits on choice and learning). In what follows, we describe new methods for investigating interdependent decision-making. Our experimental results show that people do not choose consistently, do not hold consistent beliefs, and do not in general align actions and beliefs. We will show that experimental choices are inconsistent in ways that prevent us from drawing general characterizations of an individual’s choices or beliefs or of the general population\u27s choices and beliefs. A general behavioral game theory seems a distant and, at present, unfulfilled hope

Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002

We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties’ (and not government parties’) roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties sky- rocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government

Think Different: Applying the Old Macintosh Mantra to the Computability of the SUSY Auxiliary Field Problem

Starting with valise supermultiplets obtained from 0-branes plus field redefinitions, valise adinkra networks, and the "Garden Algebra," we discuss an architecture for algorithms that (starting from on-shell theories and, through a well-defined computation procedure), search for off-shell completions. We show in one dimension how to directly attack the notorious "off-shell auxiliary field" problem of supersymmetry with algorithms in the adinkra network-world formulation.Comment: 28 pages, 1 figur

Optical/IR studies of Be stars in NGC 6834 with emphasis on two specific stars

We present optical and infrared photometric and spectroscopic studies of two Be stars in the 70--80-Myr-old open cluster NGC 6834. NGC 6834(1) has been reported as a binary from speckle interferometric studies whereas NGC 6834(2) may possibly be a gamma Cas-like variable. Infrared photometry and spectroscopy from the United Kingdom Infrared Telescope (UKIRT), and optical data from various facilities are combined with archival data to understand the nature of these candidates. High signal-to-noise near-IR spectra obtained from UKIRT have enabled us to study the optical depth effects in the hydrogen emission lines of these stars. We have explored the spectral classification scheme based on the intensity of emission lines in the $H$ and $K$ bands and contrasted it with the conventional classification based on the intensity of hydrogen and helium absorption lines. This work also presents hitherto unavailable UBV CCD photometry of NGC 6834, from which the evolutionary state of the Be stars is identified.Comment: Published in Research in Astronomy and Astrophysics, RAA 14 (2014) 1173-1192, 20 pages, 10 figure

Mathematics of random growing interfaces

We establish a thermodynamic limit and Gaussian fluctuations for the height and surface width of the random interface formed by the deposition of particles on surfaces. The results hold for the standard ballistic deposition model as well as the surface relaxation model in the off-lattice setting. The results are proved with the aid of general limit theorems for stabilizing functionals of marked Poisson point processes.Comment: 12 page

Design of a low-noise aeroacoustic wind tunnel facility at Brunel University

This paper represents the design principle of a quiet, low turbulence and moderately high speed aeroacoustic wind tunnel which was recently commissioned at Brunel University. A new hemi-anechoic chamber was purposely built to facilitate aeroacoustic measurements. The wind tunnel can achieve a maximum speed of about 80 ms-1. The turbulence intensity of the free jet in the potential core is between 0.1–0.2%. The noise characteristic of the aeroacoustic wind tunnel was validated by three case studies. All of which can demonstrate a very low background noise produced by the bare jet in comparison to the noise radiated from the cylinder rod/flat plate/airfoil in the air stream.The constructions of the aeroacoustic wind tunnel and the hemi-anechoic chamber are financially supported by the School of Engineering and Design at Brunel University